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CENSORSHIP MAKES THE SCHOOL LOOK BAD:  
WHY COURTS AND EDUCATORS MUST EMBRACE THE 
“PASSIONATE CONVERSATION”  
Frank D. LoMonte* 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier.  The Court held that students have no freedom 
to choose the content of school-sponsored newspapers or other curricular 
vehicles, so long as the justification for censorship is “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.” LoMonte argues the Court erred in 
elevating the government’s reputation to a concern of constitutional value.  
LoMonte urges the Supreme Court to re-think its decision as it has done 
with respect to persons in other categories. Young people use their talents 
to organize reform movements and have political opinions worth hearing, 
particularly about the education they are receiving. 
  
 
*   Professor & Director of the Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of Information at the 
University of Florida in Gainesville, Florida. B.A., 1992, Political Science, Georgia State 
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In June 1986, Supreme Court Justice Byron White authored Bowers v. 
Hardwick, validating the constitutionality of a Georgia statute making it a 
felony to engage in sodomy, even between consenting adults in the privacy 
of their home.1 Noting the “ancient roots” of government condemnation of 
homosexuality, White wrote that “we are quite unwilling” to recognize that 
the constitutional right to familial privacy extends to same-sex relations.2 
Chief Justice Warren Burger put an exclamation mark on the Court’s 5-4 
decision with a withering concurrence: “To hold that the act of homosexual 
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside 
millennia of moral teaching.”3 
The decision did not, as they say, age well. The Court retreated from 
Bowers just 17 years later in Lawrence v. Texas, holding that the liberty 
interests protected by the Due Process Clause encompass freedom from 
government intrusion into private sexual conduct.4 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s 6-3 majority opinion in Lawrence repudiated not just the dubious 
legal reasoning of Bowers but its larger stigmatic effect: “Its continuance as 
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons. . . . Bowers was not 
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”5 
Less than two years after Bowers, a similar Court lineup reached a 
similarly dehumanizing result in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.6 
Again, Justice White wrote for a divided Court, this time a shorthanded 5-3 
majority following Justice Lewis Powell’s retirement. In Hazelwood, the 
Court declared that students have no freedom to choose the content of 
school-sponsored newspapers or other curricular vehicles, so long as the 
school can point to a justification for censorship that is “reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”7 This deferential variant of 
reasonableness puts both thumbs on the school’s side of the scale when a 
student asserts a First Amendment claim.  
As with Bowers, a product of the same reactionary majority bent on 
 
1.   478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
2.   Id. at 191–92. 
3.   Id. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring). 
4.   539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
5.   Id. at 575, 578. 
6.   484 U.S. 260 (1988). 


















dismantling the civil-liberties legacy of the Warren Court,8 Hazelwood has 
aged poorly. In one especially coldblooded application, a federal appeals 
court relied on Hazelwood to justify a school’s decision to punish a high-
school cheerleader who refused to perform a cheer routine honoring the 
athlete she accused of raping her—because, in the court’s words, the student 
was no more than a “mouthpiece” for her school.9  
As noteworthy as Hazelwood is for its detrimental impact on journalism 
in schools, the case has outsized cultural significance beyond the newsroom. 
The propositions for which it stands—that young people are too 
irresponsible to be trusted with constitutional rights, and that the 
government may suppress political speech that provokes controversy10—are 
propositions that modern civil society is, or should be, decisively rejecting. 
We are living in a moment of renewed youth activism across a wide range 
of causes, empowered by new communication tools that dwarf the reach of 
a traditional school-produced news publications.11 That young people have 
political opinions worth hearing, particularly about the education they are 
receiving, should be a non-debatable proposition. 
This Article explains why, just as the Court in Lawrence repudiated the 
demeaning of gay and lesbian people embodied by the Bowers decision, it 
 
8.   See Thomas Healy, A Supreme Legacy, THE NATION (June 23, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/a-supreme-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/7K38-WKZQ] (citing 
scholars’ critique that the Burger Court began the “conservative counterattack” on the Warren Court’s 
civil liberties legacy and “effectively gutted” key rulings that desegregated schools, proscribed school 
prayer, and compelled police to notify criminal suspects of their rights).  
9.   Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x. 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010). The appellants 
argued the school violated the cheerleader’s right to free speech under the First Amendment because the 
cheerleader’s decision not to cheer was a symbolic expression of her disapproval of the athlete who 
allegedly sexually assault her. Id. The court held the school had no duty to promote the cheerleader’s 
message by allowing her not to cheer, and that the cheerleader’s refusal to cheer for the athlete who 
allegedly sexually assault her constituted a substantial interference with the school’s work. Id.; see also 
infra Section III.B. 
10.   See Anna Cecile Pepper, Walking Out the Schoolhouse Gates, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
198, 207 (2019) (stating that “when the student activity is school-sponsored and Hazelwood applies, a 
school will be able to restrict student political speech and curtail the expressive conduct, even if the only 
justification is to avoid controversy”); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 
99, n.368 (1996) (commenting that Hazelwood is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s recognition “of 
the extraordinary importance of protecting controversial political speech,” including in the classroom).  
11.   See Heart of the Movement: How These 12 Young Activists are Seeding Change in Their 
Towns, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2020, 9:25 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-
depth/news/nation/2020/08/17/young-activists-across-country-leading-charge-change/5598081002/ 
[https://perma.cc/4PCC-PT9D] (describing how people of color as young as seventeen are assuming 
leadership of grassroots movements in small and medium-size cities to reform racial and class 
injustices). 

















is time to do the same for Hazelwood. Over the past half-century, Congress 
and the courts have dismantled barriers that denied less-powerful categories 
of people the dignity of full legal personhood: Enacting the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,12 ending gender discrimination in public higher 
education,13 and recognizing LGBTQ+ status as a protected category under 
federal anti-discrimination law.14 One class of Americans remains 
conspicuous by its absence: The 65 million Americans who attend public 
educational institutions.15 
 
I. STUDENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN DECLINE 
 
A. Foundations of Free Expression  
 
The Bill of Rights is recognized as granting all persons, without 
exception, fundamental rights enforceable against government at all levels, 
including the school-district level.16 Among these foundational rights is the 
First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, of the press, and of the 
right to petition the government for the redress of grievances.17 The First 
Amendment is understood to forbid agencies at all levels of government 
from engaging in “prior restraint,” interdicting speech before it can be 
heard.18 The First Amendment especially disfavors content-based 
restrictions on a speaker’s message, which are presumed to be 
 
12.   Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 12101–12213 (1990). 
13.   See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ordering Virginia Military Institution 
to end practice of gender discrimination in admissions). 
14.   Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
15.   This Article focuses on public institutions because the First Amendment applies only to 
interactions between Americans and state entities, including state schools and colleges. The estimate of 
65 million attendees is compiled from Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372#College_enrollment [https://perma.cc/ENR7-
UFL8]  (14.6 million students in public colleges and universities) and Maya Riser-Kositsky, Education 
Statistics: Facts About American Schools, EDUC. WK.  (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/education-statistics/index.html [https://perma.cc/49YC-YNNF] 
(50.8 million students in public K-12 schools). 
16.   See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1336 
(stating that “the Court has created a body of rules that governs the constitutional rights that students (or 
their parents) can legitimately assert against state and local education officials”) (parentheses in 
original). 
17.   U.S. CONST. amend. I. 


















unconstitutional.19 This is doubly so if the restriction discriminates based on 
the speaker’s viewpoint, as the government is prohibited from preferring 
one side of a contested issue.20 If challenged, a content-based restriction will 
be deemed unconstitutional unless it is shown to be narrowly tailored to 
restrict no more speech than is necessary to achieve a compelling 
government interest.21 
When a speaker seeks to use government property as the vehicle to 
convey a message, such as staging a rally in a public park, federal courts 
analyze First Amendment disputes under the “public forum” doctrine, 
which gives the government leeway to manage public property to preserve 
its intended use and character.22 A speaker’s right to use government 
property for expression depends on the nature of the property and its 
amenability to expressive use.23 Once property is deemed to be a forum, 
either by tradition or because the government has “designated” it for 
expressive use, strict scrutiny applies to any content-based restrictions on 
the use of the forum, including decisions to selectively exclude speakers.24 
The government may, however, enforce reasonable and viewpoint-neutral 
regulations on the time, place and manner of speech, such as restricting the 
use of electronic amplifiers in a park.25  
In everyday life, the First Amendment, as with all constitutional rights, 
 
19.   See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”). 
20.   See id. at 391–92. 
21.   See United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a statute regulates 
speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest.”). 
22.   See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (describing 
forum analysis as “a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its 
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other 
purposes”). 
23.   Id. 
24 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (“Once a forum is opened up to 
assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking 
on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on 
content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.”). Under the “strict scrutiny” 
standard, “a government restriction on speech will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest.” Lindsey Gold, Music Videos: The Gray Area in First Amendment Protected 
Speech and the Resulting Trademark Consequences, 2018 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 13, 22 (2018). 
25 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that, in a public forum, 
content-neutral regulations on the time, place and manner of speech will be constitutional if they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave ample alternative channels for 
communication). 

















applies with full force regardless of age.26 For example, a police officer 
would require no lesser degree of evidentiary basis to search a car driven by 
a teenager as opposed to one driven by a middle-aged adult. But within 
certain contexts—prisons, the workplace, and public schools—
constitutional rights diminish, at times to the point of near-nonexistence.27  
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the Constitution as a check on 
coercive school authority in the 1943 case of West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette.28 There, the justices sided with Jehovah’s Witness 
families resisting a state regulation that compelled students to stand, salute 
the American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance, contrary to the 
plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.29 In a stirringly written opinion for the Court, 
Justice Robert H. Jackson made no mention of the school setting or the age 
of the affected speakers; for him, the case was simply about a government 
agency’s authority to compel individuals to profess beliefs they may not 
genuinely hold: 
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic 
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a 
compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of 
the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . [F]reedom 
to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. 
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the 
heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.30  
 
26.   See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional 
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of 
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”).  
27.   See Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners – Oh My! A Cautionary Note 
About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640 
(2007) (“[L]ike many things in life, considering institutional context is good in moderation, bad in 
excess. By dividing speech rights so starkly by institutional context, courts have not just recognized, but 
in fact overstated, the uniqueness of schools, workplaces, and prisons.”). 
28.   319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
29.   See id. at 629–30, 642. 


















The justices did not return to the subject of student speech rights until 
1969, amid widespread domestic unrest occasioned by diminishing support 
for the war in Vietnam. Siblings John and Mary Beth Tinker and a 
classmate, Christopher Eckhardt, asked the Court to find that their silent act 
of protest—wearing black armbands to school in support of a ceasefire in 
Vietnam—was protected speech beyond the authority of a public school to 
prevent or punish.31 In a 7-2 decision, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the justices coined an enduring standard to 
determine where a student’s rights end and the school’s punitive authority 
begins: Speech may be proscribed only where the prohibition is “necessary 
to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or 
discipline.”32 And in the Tinker case, no disruption occurred or was 
realistically forecast.33 Justice Abe Fortas’ majority opinion resounded with 
Barnette’s pro-democracy rhetoric, viewing the choice as one of 
constitutional imperatives over a government agency’s convenience: 
 [I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom 
of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation 
may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority’s 
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the 
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views 
of another person may start an argument or cause a 
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this 
risk . . . and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous 
freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our 
national strength.34 
As important as Tinker was in advancing the law of the First 
Amendment, the decision carried equally great symbolic weight; it 
recognized that schools are government regulators subject to meaningful 
constitutional constraints, and that those constraints are fundamental to the 
work of teaching citizenship.35 As one commentator has written, the Tinker 
 
31.   Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
32.   Id. at 511. 
33.   Id. at 514. 
34.   Id. at 508–09. 
35.   See Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial 
Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1505 (2008) (discussing how Tinker recognizes “the role 

















decision “articulated a relationship between students’ liberty and adults’ 
democratic self-governance . . . Simply put, schools create citizens to 
sustain our democracy by training students to know and exercise their First 
Amendment rights.”36 
Scholars disagree over how meaningful the checking force of Tinker 
really is, with some skeptics pointing to the inherent malleability of the 
“material and substantial interference” standard.37 Nevertheless, a half-
century of experience demonstrates that it has at least been possible for a 
student plaintiff with a sympathetic set of facts to win a First Amendment 
case governed by the Tinker standard, particularly where courts find value 
in the students’ political or religious messages.38  
In the two decades following Tinker, student journalists not-
infrequently sought refuge in the decision to protect their independence.39 
They often prevailed. In one illustrative case, decided just months after 
Tinker, a federal district court in New York found that the Tinker principle 
extended to students’ decision to accept a strongly worded newspaper 
advertisement opposing the Vietnam War.40 Taking note of the ongoing 
turmoil over antiwar protest activity, the judge concluded:  
 
students' First Amendment rights play in mitigating the democratic perils of public education”). 
36.   Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 211, 212 (2013). 
37.   Compare Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Great Unfulfilled Promise of Tinker, 105 VA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 159, 160 (2019) (“This [Tinker] standard is unnecessarily deferential to school 
administrators and poses precisely the sort of censorship that the Court would never tolerate outside of 
the school setting.”), with Christine Snyder, Reversing the Tide: Restoring First Amendment Ideals in 
America’s Schools Through Legislative Protections for Journalism Students and Advisors, 2014 B.Y.U. 
EDUC. & L.J. 71, 74 (2014) (stating that Tinker “set a high bar for the actions of school administrators 
in the future”). 
38.   See, e.g., Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F. 3d 320, 330–31 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Tinker and holding that school could not prevent student from wearing T-shirt carrying political message 
mocking President George W. Bush as a substance abuser and draft dodger). 
39.   See Gambino v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 564 F.2d 157, 158 (4th Cir. 1977) (enjoining 
school from prohibiting publication of article referring to birth control); Stanton v. Brunswick Sch. 
Dep’t, 577 F. Supp. 1560, 1575 (D. Me. 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction enjoining school 
officials from removing student’s yearbook quote deemed objectionable); Reineke v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (applying Tinker and granting a preliminary injunction 
after finding that school violated student editors’ First Amendment rights by confiscating editions of 
class-produced newspaper and removing portions of articles in other editions); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. 
Supp. 1164, 1165–66 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding that school violated First Amendment by confiscating 
student-produced newspaper supplement containing information about contraception and abortion, 
because there was no showing that the information was harmful).  


















This lawsuit arises at a time when many in the educational 
community oppose the tactics of the young in securing a 
political voice. It would be both incongruous and 
dangerous for this court to hold that students who wish to 
express their views on matters intimately related to them, 
through traditionally accepted nondisruptive modes of 
communication, may be precluded from doing so by that 
same adult community.41  
At a time of violent unrest in America’s streets—a time with resonant 
modern-day echoes—the Zucker court recognized that journalism was a 
constructive outlet through which young people could vent outrage over a 
war they were at imminent risk of being summoned to fight. 
 
B. The Rise of Deference to School Authoritarianism  
 
The Tinker decision represented the crest of the sixteen-year Warren 
Court’s remaking of the nation’s civil-liberties landscape, a period that also 
produced the Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation 
breakthrough,42 the Gideon decision guaranteeing felony criminal 
defendants the right to counsel,43 and scores of others. But the author of 
Tinker, Justice Abe Fortas, resigned just two months after writing the 
decision, and a month later, Chief Justice Earl Warren retired.44 Those 
departures, followed by Justice William O. Douglas’ retirement in 1975, 
reshaped the bench, giving way to an era of “law-and-order” jurisprudence 
unreceptive to plaintiffs’ civil-rights claims in general—and students’ in 
particular. 
It took seventeen years for another student speech case to reach the 
Court. By then, the lineup of justices, and their philosophy, was 
unrecognizable from the Tinker days. In Bethel Area School District v. 
Fraser,45 the Court signaled that maintaining order and teaching decorum 
 
41.   Id.  
42.   347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
43.   Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
44.   See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the 
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527–28 (2000) (explaining that 
Warren already had announced his planned retirement when Tinker was decided, and that Fortas resigned 
shortly afterward “amidst a scandal”) (hereinafter, “Chemerinsky, Schoolhouse”).  
45.   478 U.S. 675 (1986). 

















would take priority over students’ interests in self-expression.46 In Fraser, 
the Court dispensed with the First Amendment claims of a student 
disciplined for a student government nominating speech, in front of a school 
assembly, peppered with double entendre references to genitalia.47 
Acknowledging that the speaker’s attempt at humor was not punishably 
disruptive under the Tinker standard, the Court simply crafted a new one: 
The speech was unprotected because it was “offensively lewd and 
indecent.”48  
Although the Fraser decision was narrow, the mentality shift that the 
case represented was profound. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion heavily 
relied on the majority’s philosophy of education as a vehicle to “inculcate 
the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to 
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the 
community and the nation.”49 Even so, the decision acknowledged the need 
for a balancing approach that recognizes the value of student voices: “The 
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in 
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s 
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior.”50  
When the Hazelwood case reached the Court just two years later, the 
balancing approach was nowhere to be found. In Hazelwood, the student 
editors of the Spectrum newspaper at Missouri’s Hazelwood East High 
School prepared a package of articles addressing social problems of 
consequence in students’ lives: Teen pregnancy, the dangers of running 
away from home, growing up in a home with divorced parents, and the 
failure rate of teen marriages.51 Decades later, one of the former student 
editors, Cathy Kuhlmeier, recalled that the editors decided to feature the 
cautionary pregnancy story prominently because dozens of her classmates 
were having babies, forcing the school to open a daycare center.52 As 
 
46.   See id. at 683–84. 
47.   The majority did not see fit to reproduce the offending parts of the speech, but Justice 
William Brennan did so in his dissent. See id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
48.   Id. at 685. 
49.   Id. at 681 (internal quotes and citation omitted). 
50.   Id. 
51.   Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1457 (E.D. Mo. 1985).   
52.   See October 2016 Podcast: Meet the OG in the Fight for Student Press Freedom, 
STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Oct. 31, 2016), https://splc.org/2016/10/october-2016-podcast-meet-the-og-in-


















customary, the journalism teacher submitted proofs of the newspaper to 
Principal Robert Reynolds before the paper was sent to the printer.53 
Reynolds disapproved of the pregnancy article and the parental divorce 
article, and ordered the journalism teacher to remove the two pages 
containing those articles before sending the paper to press.54 The school’s 
proffered rationales for removing the articles focused on two concerns: That 
the pregnancy story failed to adequately anonymize three quoted students, 
and that the divorce story lacked any responsive comments from the 
absentee father referred to as an “alcoholic.”55  
The students challenged the decision to remove the articles, arguing that 
the school’s rationales did not satisfy the Tinker burden.56 The district court 
surveyed the caselaw since Tinker and concluded that schools had been 
afforded greater control over speech that is entwined with the educational 
process: “Where the particular program or activity is an integral part of the 
school's educational function, something less than substantial disruption of 
the educational process may justify prior restraints on students' speech and 
press activities.”57 Contrary to the Tinker approach, which did not recognize 
any variation in the level of constitutional protection based on where speech 
takes place, the district court introduced the “forum” concept into student 
speech law, finding that the decisive question was whether the vehicle being 
used for expression “is an open and public forum of free expression or an 
integral part of the curriculum.”58 And the Spectrum newspaper, the judge 
concluded, was the latter.59 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that a public 
forum analysis was proper, but disagreed on its application.60 The court 
noted that the Spectrum operated both as a matter of policy and as a matter 
of practice as a forum for student expression; the school district’s written 
policies emphasized the freedom to “express one’s own opinions on the 
controversial issues,” and the newspaper’s staff had repeatedly done so 
without incident.61 “Spectrum was not just a class exercise in which students 
 
53.   Id. at 263–64. 
54.   Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263–64 (1988). 
55.   Hazelwood, 607 F. Supp. at 1460. 
56.   Id. at 1461–62. 
57.   Id. at 1463.  
58.   Id.  
59.   Id. at 1465. 
60.   Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371–72 (8th Cir. 1986). 
61.   Id. at 1373. 

















learned to prepare papers and hone writing skills,” Judge Gerald Heaney 
wrote, “it was a public forum established to give students an opportunity to 
express their views while gaining an appreciation of their rights and 
responsibilities under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and their state constitution.”62 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, on a 5–3 vote with one 
vacancy, reversed.63 Following the district court’s roadmap, the Court 
divided student speech into two distinct categories.64 The first, still 
governed by Tinker, encompasses “personal expression that happens to 
occur on the school premises.”65 The second, henceforth subject to 
diminished protection, encompasses “school-sponsored publications, 
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, 
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur 
of the school.”66 The Court offered three rationales for which school 
authorities might defensibly exert censorship authority over this latter 
category: “[T]o assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity 
is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that 
may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the 
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”67 When 
students’ speech bears the school’s imprimatur, Justice White wrote for the 
Court, schools’ employees are free to exert control over its content, “so long 
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”68 
To the majority, the distinction came down to whether a school was being 
asked to “tolerate” speech, or to affirmatively “promote” the speech.69 
Relaxing the school’s burden to justify censorship of school-sponsored 
speech, Justice White wrote, is “consistent with our oft-expressed view that 
the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, 
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”70  
Gone were any concerns for larger democratic principles or the need to 
constrain government’s coercive power. Paramount in Hazelwood was 
 
62.   Id. 
63.   Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). 
64.   Id. at 270–71. 
65.   Id.  
66.   Id. 
67.   Id.  
68.   Id. at 273. 
69.   Id. at 270–71. 


















concern for the image of the school, and how an ill-considered news article 
might confuse readers into attributing undesirable sentiments to the school. 
Nothing in the majority’s opinion acknowledged any civic or educational 
value in student expression, or considered that the content of the articles 
addressed contemporary social issues of public concern—the speech that, 
in the off-campus world, the Court has most vigilantly protected.71 
In a stirring dissent, Justice William Brennan rebuked the majority for 
its noxious “civics lesson” of judicially legitimized government image 
control.72 To the Court’s central concern, that distasteful student speech 
would be wrongly ascribed to the school itself, Brennan identified less 
speech-restrictive alternatives; The school could require newspapers to 
carry a disclaimer, or the school could engage in counter-speech, the remedy 
that the Court always prescribes first.73 Brennan dismantled each of the 
majority’s stated rationales for lowering the censorship bar, but saved 
special scorn for the “disassociation” rationale.74 Allowing school 
authorities for purposes of avoiding association with controversy, he wrote, 
“in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a student newspaper, unless 
one believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is to teach students 
that the press ought never report bad news, express unpopular views, or print 
a thought that might upset its sponsors.”75 
Among the legal and journalism communities, reaction to Hazelwood 
was swift and overwhelming: The Court had gone much too far, further even 
than necessary to decide the case. “[E]ducators will be free to censor any 
topic they deem to fall under the amorphous penumbra of ‘legitimate 
pedagogical concern,’” one legal commentator wrote months after the 
ruling.76 A veteran journalism professor predicted that the decision would 
backfire by driving students to leave school-supervised publications and, 
without training or oversight, start their own: “[W]hile the school board in 
 
71.   See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (finding that anti-gay hate speech by 
protesters could not be penalized by the government, even indirectly through an award of civil damages 
in litigation by private parties, because the issue of gay rights is a matter of public concern); see also 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.”). 
72.   Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277, 291 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
73.   Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
74.   Id. at 282–89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
75.   Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
76.   Helene Bryks, A Lesson in School Censorship: Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 55 BROOK. L. 
REV. 291, 325 (1989). 

















Hazelwood won the case, public education in general suffered a devastating 
defeat.”77 Two attorneys with the Student Press Law Center accused the 
justices of “using an atom bomb to swat a fly.”78 After Hazelwood, 
administrators began taking advantage of their augmented legal authority 
“to censor all student-authored articles with which the district did not 
agree.”79  
The judicial rollback of free-speech law was part of a larger movement 
to dismantle student constitutional rights.80 In 1985, Justice White, who 
would go on to write the Hazelwood opinion, wrote for the majority in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., diminishing students’ Fourth Amendment right to be 
protected against unreasonable searches by school authorities.81 Just as the 
Court would soon do in the First Amendment context, the T.L.O. court 
created a lesser level of Fourth Amendment protection that relaxes the 
government’s normal burden to justify a search, from “probable cause” to 
mere “reasonable suspicion,” when the target of the search is a student.82 In 
a sentiment that would echo soon afterward in Hazelwood, Justice White 
wrote:  
[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of 
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and 
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools 
does not require strict adherence to the requirement that 
searches be based on probable cause to believe that the 
subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.83  
In other words, the Court regarded the privacy concerns of students in 
school as being of diminished value as compared with adults in the off-
 
77.   W. Wat Hopkins, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier: Sound Constitutional Law, Unsound 
Pedagogy, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 536 (1989). 
78.   See J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press 
Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 726 (1988). 
79.   Sara Prose, Note, Dean v. Utica Community Schools: A Significant Victory for the Student 
Press Community and a Potential Guiding Force to the Reexamination of the Hazelwood Holding, 87 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 247, 261 (2010). 
80.   See Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of 
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 319 (1992) (observing that Hazelwood “was not an isolated decision 
but rather one that came on the heels of more than a decade of Court rulings shifting the balance away 
from individual student rights toward school authority and community interests”). 
81.   469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
82.   Id. at 341–42. 


















campus world, and viewed the school’s interest in “order” as weighty 
enough to override those diminished privacy concerns.  
In the years that followed, the Court would build on Justice White’s 
T.L.O. foundation to find that the Fourth Amendment permits subjecting 
student athletes to drug tests—at the beginning of each playing season, and 
then by random draw throughout the season—as a condition of being 
allowed to take part in sports.84 And the Court would then expand that ruling 
to any student participating in any extracurricular activity, even a non-
dangerous one in which intoxication does not present any substantial risk of 
harming the student or others.85 In the latter decision, the Court expressly 
cited T.L.O. and the “special needs” of the school environment86 to justify 
an intrusion that almost certainly would not be tolerated in the adult world 
as a condition of receiving a government benefit or privilege.87  
This line of caselaw reflects a credulous view of government as a 
benevolent protector of students that cannot be encumbered in its protective 
zeal by constitutional niceties. Although students arguably need even 
stronger constitutional protection against government overreaching as 
compared with the off-campus adult world, because of their vulnerability to 
coercion and because they spend most of their weekday hours in a custodial 
setting, the Court has swung the pendulum decidedly in the opposite 
direction. 
 
C. Where the Hazelwood Court Went Wrong  
 
While the primary focus of this Article is to move the discussion past 
Hazelwood regardless of whether the decision is defensibly consistent with 
First Amendment precedent, it bears noting that the decision is not just 
unsound educational policy but also is legally flawed in critical ways.  
Shoehorning student newspapers into the public forum doctrine is an 
uncomfortable squeeze. Student newspapers are not amenable to the same 
analysis that applies to sidewalks, streets and other physical government 
 
84.   Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
85.   Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836–38 (2002). 
86.   Id. at 829. 
87.   See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (striking down state statute requiring 
that candidates produce a clean drug test as a condition of qualifying for elected office); Lebron v. Sec’y, 
Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013) (enjoining enforcement of a Florida statute 
denying welfare benefits to applicants who declined to submit to a suspicionless drug test). 

















property. The reason that courts apply the public forum doctrine to 
government property is not so that the government can disavow 
responsibility for poor spelling or grammar, but so that the property can be 
maintained for its primary intended use.88 A fundraising table can be 
removed from the sidewalk outside of a U.S. Post Office because the 
sidewalk is intended to facilitate entry and exit by postal patrons.89 But the 
primary purpose of a student newspaper is to carry student-authored articles. 
An article about teen pregnancy does not obstruct the use of the newspaper 
for its primary purpose. Nor did the Hazelwood principal remove the article 
to ration the use of a limited piece of property for other speakers; two pages 
of the Spectrum were removed, not replaced with competing content.90 This 
decisively differentiates the Hazelwood setting from the signature Perry 
Education case, in which the Court accepted the school’s justification that 
teacher mailboxes could not be held open for indiscriminate use by outsiders 
so as to avoid drowning out official school communications.91 As the Court 
said in Perry Education: “[W]hen government property is not dedicated to 
open communication the government may—without further justification—
restrict use to those who participate in the forum’s official business.”92 The 
editors of the Hazelwood East newspaper were the authorized participants 
in the forum’s “official business.” Their presence was the entire purpose for 
the forum, not a distraction from it.93  
Moreover, the Hazelwood decision is internally inconsistent, because it 
specifies that censorship must be justified by a rationale “reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns,” but then identifies the school’s desire 
 
88.   See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (“[T]he 
Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting 
the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property 
for other purposes.”). 
89.   See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732–35 (1990) (“The purpose of the forum 
in this case is to accomplish the most efficient and effective postal delivery system.”). 
90.   Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 264 (1988). 
91.   See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators' Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47–48 (1983) 
(selective exclusion of speakers from school mailboxes could be justified by imperative of “preservation 
of the facilities for school-related business”). 
92.   Id. at 53. 
93.   Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–68. The same is true of the other context in which Hazelwood 
is regularly invoked to validate school censorship: The commencement speech. See infra notes 123–26 
and accompanying text. The valedictory speaker is the one-and-only authorized user of the podium. Her 
speech occupies the same amount of time and space whether she thanks her principal or thanks her God, 


















to avoid association with political controversy as an acceptable reason to 
censor.94 There is no pedagogical value in teaching journalists to avoid 
matters of political controversy. In a 2013 resolution timed to coincide with 
the 25th anniversary of the Hazelwood decision, the Association for 
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, the leading 
international membership organization for postsecondary journalism 
educators nationwide, declared:  
[N]o legitimate pedagogical purpose is served by the 
censorship of student journalism even if it reflects 
unflatteringly on school policies and programs, candidly 
discusses sensitive social and political issues, or voices 
opinions challenging to majority views on matters of public 
concern. The censorship of such speech is detrimental to 
effective learning and teaching, and it cannot be justified 
by reference to ‘pedagogical concerns.’95 
 
With these words, the most prominent experts in the field of journalism 
education identified the fallacy that Hazelwood is about, or has ever been 
about, the quality of instruction.  
  
 
94.   Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
95.   Resolution One 2013, ASS’N FOR EDUC. IN JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’N (Apr. 2, 
2013), http://www.aejmc.org/home/2013/04/resolution-one-2013/ [https://perma.cc/XNZ8-VS8H].  

















II. THE CIVIC AND EDUCATIONAL TOLL OF HAZELWOOD 
 
A. Fighting City Hall – and Losing (Almost) Every Time  
 
In 2005, Robert Ochshorn and his fellow editors of the Tattler 
newspaper at New York’s Ithaca High School challenged their school’s 
decision to censor an editorial cartoon ridiculing the ineffectiveness of the 
sex education program.96 To dramatize their point—that sex education was 
taught in an unrealistic way, causing students to treat it as a joke—the 
editors sought to publish a cartoon that depicted a teacher trying to teach a 
sex-education class using poorly drawn stick figures in coupling poses.97 
The faculty adviser ordered the editors to remove the cartoon, and the 
editors sued.98  
The district court found that the newspaper operated as a limited public 
forum, citing substantial evidence in policy and practice that the school 
ceded some editorial discretion to the student editors: The faculty adviser 
did not select the editors, assign story ideas, direct the staff meetings, or 
select or edit guest submissions, and the paper functioned as an 
extracurricular activity and was not produced as a graded class 
assignment.99 The Second Circuit accepted that the newspaper constituted a 
limited public forum, but found that in the context of a student newspaper, 
limited public forum status offers no enhanced protection beyond 
Hazelwood, so the cartoon could freely be censored.100 The “forum,” by the 
court’s understanding, consisted only of “content consistent with a 
supervised, age-appropriate learning experience for student editors and high 
school readers.”101 In other words, even where a forum exists—which the 
Supreme Court stated would relieve students from the Hazelwood level of 
control—the “forum” can confer “freedom” to publish only articles the 
school deems appropriate.   
In his exhaustive look at the legal landscape in the twenty-five years 
following Hazelwood, Professor Kozlowski concluded that students 
 
96.   R.O. ex rel. Ochshorn v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 2011). 
97.   Id. at 536. 
98.   Id. at 536–38. 
99.   R.O by Ochshorn v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., No. 5:05–CV–695, 2009 WL 10677063, at *13 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009). 
100.   R.O. ex rel. Ochshorn, 645 F.3d at 540. 


















virtually never prevailed in First Amendment challenges once courts made 
the threshold determination that Hazelwood, rather than Tinker, supplied the 
standard.102 “[W]hen a court rules that Hazelwood controls a case,” 
Kozlowski’s analysis concluded, “almost always the First Amendment 
claimant is about to lose because the ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns’ 
standard is applied so deferentially. Hazelwood has been stretched far from 
its factual moorings, and the ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns’ standard is 
interpreted so loosely that courts have rendered it effectively 
meaningless.”103 
The unmooring of Hazelwood began almost immediately. Although the 
Supreme Court pointedly reserved judgment in Hazelwood as to whether 
adult-age college students could be subject to the same smothering level of 
institutional control,104 the Eleventh Circuit soon answered: Yes, they 
can.105 In a March 1989 ruling, the appeals court applied Hazelwood in 
dismissing the First Amendment claims of University of Alabama student 
government candidates aggrieved by speech-restrictive campaign rules: 
“The University should be entitled to place reasonable restrictions on this 
learning experience. . . . The University judgment on matters such as this 
should be given great deference by federal courts.”106 Subsequently, the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have likewise applied Hazelwood to speech by 
college students,107 while the Sixth Circuit has equivocated.108   
 
102.   Dan V. Kozlowski, Unchecked Deference: Hazelwood's Too Broad and Too Loose 
Application in the Circuit Courts, 3 U. BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 1 (2012). 
103.   Id. at 6. 
104.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273–74, n.7 (1988) (“We need not now 
decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive 
activities at the college and university level.”). 
105.  Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989). 
106.   Id. 
107.   Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (regarding censorship of a college 
paper); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (regarding a drama student’s refusal 
on religious grounds to use off-color language during an assigned performance). 
108.   In a case involving a college yearbook, the en banc court decided in Kincaid v. Gibson, 
236 F.3d 342,  (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), that college media operate as public forums immune from the 
Hazelwood level of control. See id. at 352 (“[W]e find that the fact that the forum at issue arises in the 
university context mitigates in favor of finding that the yearbook is a limited public forum.”). But 
subsequently, in Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012), the court applied Hazelwood to speech 
by a college graduate student regarding her instructional practicum assignment, even though the student 
did not seek to reach an audience beyond a one-to-one conversation with her instructor. The takeaway 
from the two cases read together is that the Sixth Circuit believes Hazelwood and its forum analysis to 
be applicable to college student speech, but that clear evidence of an intent and practice of operating a 
designated public forum will carry the day. 

















The Sixth Circuit’s Ward v. Polite involved a graduate student removed 
from a masters’ program in counseling because of her speech. In that case, 
the student plaintiff was punished for telling her supervisor that she could 
not comfortably offer counseling about same-sex relationships because of 
her religious beliefs.109 Ward exemplifies a different type of expansion: 
Applying Hazelwood to speech directed to academic supervisors, where the 
student is speaking about the delivery of instruction but is not speaking as 
part of the delivery of instruction.110 In rejecting the graduate student’s First 
Amendment claim, the court explained, “[t]he key word is student. 
Hazelwood respects the latitude educational institutions—at any level—
must have to further legitimate curricular objectives.”111 
Courts have likewise expansively applied the Hazelwood standard in 
cases where no instruction at all was taking place: Forbidding a kindergarten 
student from handing out pencils to classmates inscribed with a message 
about Jesus,112 preventing an elementary-schooler from selling religious-
themed candy canes as part of a student vendor fair in the school 
gymnasium,113 and refusing to post a religious advertisement on the outfield 
fence of the high school baseball park.114 As these cases demonstrate, in 
practice, the Hazelwood doctrine comes down to a legally sanctioned device 
for minimizing controversy, even where the only plausible educational 
“benefit” is teaching students to obey orders. And once Hazelwood is 
reduced to a vehicle for teaching obedience, every censorship directive 
becomes self-validating—as in the case of a Colorado graduation speaker 
punished for deviating from a school-sanitized version of her remarks, 
because a federal appeals court found that the process of submitting to the 
censors’ review was itself “related to learning.”115 
 
109.  Id. at 733–34. 
110.  667 F.3d at 740–41. 
111.   Id. at 733. See also Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 869, 882 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(applying Hazelwood on facts essentially identical to Ward, in which a student voiced religious-based 
discomfort at being assigned to counsel LGBT children); Heenan v. Rhodes, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 
1237–38 (M.D. Ala. 2010), amended on reh’g by 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (applying the 
Hazelwood standard to punitive action against a college nursing student who complained to her 
instructors about inequities in the grading and disciplinary systems, without evidence that the complaints 
took place during instructional time or interfered with instruction). 
112.   Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 275–77 (3d Cir. 2003). 
113.   Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 574, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2008). 
114.   DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 1999). 
115.   Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 2009). Professor 


















The resulting impenetrability of Hazelwood deference leaves students 
defenseless against even the most egregious abuse of school authority, 
where the censor is actively concealing school malfeasance or giving effect 
to community prejudices. 
In Lenoir City, Tennessee, a journalism teacher was demoted for failing 
to censor a yearbook article—“It’s OK to be Gay”—that supportively 
chronicled a student’s coming-out decision, and one school board member 
called for the teacher to be criminally investigated for supporting the 
decision to publish it.116 The same Tennessee school censored the student 
newspaper editor’s first-person column—“No Rights: The Life of an 
Atheist”—calling for her community to be more tolerant of people with 
different religious beliefs.117 The superintendent explained that political and 
religious topics were to be avoided because they might provoke “passionate 
conversations.”118 
A New Jersey high school squelched a student editor’s report, based 
largely on information gleaned from publicly accessible school board 
meetings, about a string of misconduct complaints filed against the district 
school superintendent, alleging that the story fell short of the school’s 
standards because it used information from anonymous sources and 
concerned a “confidential” personnel dispute.119 The article was belatedly 
published, but only after the superintendent had resigned to accept another 
 
teaching obedience to authority runs counter to student cognitive development: “Learning in accordance 
with conceptual development . . . both encourages and requires students to actively think for themselves 
and to articulate their thoughts.” This “requires schools to be substantially tolerant of, and indeed to 
promote, all forms of student expression because such expression advances the students' conceptual 
development.” Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual 
Development, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1269, 1301 (1991). 
116.   Hugh G. Willett, Yearbook Story on Gay Student Ignites Controversy, CHATTANOOGA 
 TIMES FREE PRESS (May 3, 2012), 
https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/news/story/2012/may/03/tennessee-yearbook-story-gay-student-
ignites-contr/76986/ [https://perma.cc/8MFK-DBWB].  
117.   Hugh G. Willett, Lenoir City High School Won't Publish Atheist Student's Editorial on 




118.   Gene Policinski, ‘Passionate Conversations’ in Schools are a Good Thing, FREEDOM F. 
INST. (June 8, 2012), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2012/06/08/passionate-conversations-in-
schools-are-a-good-thing/ [https://perma.cc/BW2F-VZRE].  
119.   Sara Gregory, New Jersey School Board Will Vote Monday Whether to Uphold Principal's 
Censorship, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (May 15, 2014), https://splc.org/2014/05/new-jersey-school-
board-will-vote-monday-whether-to-uphold-principals-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/323Y-AEL2]. 

















job and the newspaper’s faculty adviser abruptly resigned.120 
In Texas, an award-winning journalism teacher lost her job for 
supporting her students in a controversy over their ability to publish candid 
news coverage that the principal told student editors, “cast the school in a 
bad light.”121 The principal of Prosper High School, John Burdett, 
temporarily banned the school-sponsored newspaper from publishing any 
editorials after a draft editorial criticized his administration’s management 
of a student assembly, which he called “not uplifting.”122 
Nor has the Hazelwood rationale been limited to the newspapers and 
theatrical performances mentioned in the Court’s ruling. Commencement 
speeches are commonly censored, and noncompliant speakers punished, by 
reference to the Hazelwood standard.123 In Tampa Bay, a principal ejected 
the class salutatorian from the graduation ceremony in mid-speech because 
he paused while reading his school-sanitized text, leading the principal to 
fear that he was about to go off-script into a rant about his pet peeve, the 
school’s filthy bathrooms.124 A 19-year-old valedictory speaker in Dallas 
was interrupted when the principal ordered her microphone cut as she began 
to read remarks about police violence against Black people, which school 
 
120.   Jenna Spoont, Formerly Censored Article Published in New Jersey Student Newspaper 
After School Board and Principal Give OK, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (June 13, 2014), 
https://splc.org/2014/06/formerly-censored-article-published-in-new-jersey-student-newspaper-after-
school-board-and-principal/ [https://perma.cc/4EUH-23Z4]; Jenna Spoont, New Jersey Journalism 
Adviser Resigns from Position After Censorship Controversy, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (June 27, 2014), 
https://splc.org/2014/06/new-jersey-journalism-adviser-resigns-from-position-after-censorship-
controversy/ [https://perma.cc/HK54-LPVM]. 
121.   Danny Gallagher, Prosper High's Newspaper Staff Says New Principal Censored Stories, 
Ousted Adviser, DALL. OBSERVER (June 8, 2018), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/censorship-at-
ponder-high-riles-student-journalists-leads-to-advisers-ouster-10764146 [https://perma.cc/CSE9-
9QUJ].  
122.   Nanette Light, Prosper High School Journalists Allege Newspaper Censorship by 
Principal, Fight Editorial Policy, DALL. MORNING NEWS (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2018/05/25/prosper-high-school-journalists-allege-newspaper-
censorship-by-principal-fight-editorial-policy/ [https://perma.cc/W425-DSVP]. 
123.   See, e.g., Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist., 566 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(denying First Amendment claim of student who was punished for inserting a reference to her faith into 
a school-approved text of her commencement speech, because the process of having the speech reviewed 
by the school is “related to learning”); see also Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 
(N.D. Okla. 2016) (finding that Hazelwood precluded a student’s First Amendment claim for being 
denied the ability to adorn her graduation cap with a feather to honor her Native American heritage). 
124.   See Daniel Ruth, Wharton Salutatorian Deserved His Moment, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 
14, 2013), https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/ruth-wharton-salutatorian-deserved-his-


















reviewers had edited out.125 An Oklahoma valedictorian was denied her 
diploma because she refused to issue a written apology after substituting 
“hell” for “heck” in her pre-approved commencement speech.126 Here, too, 
none of the animating concerns behind Hazelwood—exposing students to 
unduly mature or poorly written speech, or committing defamation or 
invasion of privacy127—are implicated, except for the school’s imperative 
to dampen controversy. 
 
B. The Silsbee Case: No Longer “Persons Under our Constitution”  
 
During a February 2009 high school basketball game, one member of 
the Silsbee High School cheerleading squad did something outwardly 
unremarkable that ignited a First Amendment controversy: She folded her 
arms across her chest and sat down.128 The cheerleader, “Hillaire S.,” made 
the decision to silently sit out performing a routine honoring a particular 
basketball player, Rakheem Bolton, because months earlier she had reported 
to police that Bolton raped her at an afterschool party when she was too 
intoxicated to consent to sex.129 The cheerleading coach pulled Hillaire 
aside into a hallway, where the school principal and school superintendent 
gave her an order: Cheer for everyone, or no one.130 She refused, and was 
dismissed from the team.131  
Her family sued school officials, alleging due process and First 
Amendment violations.132 School attorneys countered with schools’ most 
effective weapon: Hazelwood.  
 
125.   Elisha Fieldstadt, Dallas School District Apologizes for Cutting Off Valedictorian's 
Speech, NBC NEWS (June 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dallas-school-district-
apologizes-cutting-valedictorian-s-speech-n1016431 [https://perma.cc/T294-L5DY].  
126.   Tu Thanh Ha, U.S. Valedictorian Denied High School Diploma for Saying ‘Hell’ in 
Speech, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-
valedictorian-denied-high-school-diploma-for-saying-hell-in-speech/article4489629/ 
[https://perma.cc/S9UE-NNVG]. 
127.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
128.   Carolina Heldman, A Cheerleader’s Rape in a Small Texas Town, MS. MAG. (May 27, 
2011), https://msmagazine.com/2011/05/27/a-cheerleaders-rape-in-a-small-texas-town/ 
[https://perma.cc/G6AN-6MJ7]; see Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x. 852 (5th Cir. 2010). 
129.   Heldman, supra note 128. 
130.  Id. 
131.   Id.  
132.  C. & C.S. v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:09-CV-374-TH, 2009 WL 10679659, at *4 
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2009). 

















A federal district court granted the school defendants’ motion to dismiss 
all claims.133 U.S. District Judge Thad Heartfield found that there could be 
no due process violation, because no due process is required when a school 
makes the discretionary decision to take away the privilege of participating 
in extracurricular activities.134 The judge did not even address the 
applicability of Hazelwood, finding as a threshold matter that Hillaire’s act 
of sitting out the cheer was not sufficiently expressive for purposes of a First 
Amendment claim, because it did not “convey the sort of particularized 
message that symbolic conduct must convey to be protected speech.”135  
On appeal, a Fifth Circuit panel made up of Judges Emilio Garza, Edith 
Clement and Priscilla Owen issued a brief unsigned opinion summarily 
affirming dismissal.136 The court held that, even if silently sitting could be 
construed as expressive conduct, the family could not proceed on a First 
Amendment claim because, under Hazelwood, the school had no duty to 
“promote” Hillaire’s message: “In her capacity as cheerleader, H.S. served 
as a mouthpiece through which [the school district] could disseminate 
speech – namely, support for its athletic teams.”137 The court went on to find 
that sitting out the cheerleading routine “constituted substantial interference 
with the work of the school, because as a cheerleader, H.S. was at the 
basketball game for the purpose of cheering, a position she undertook 
voluntarily.”138 
For good measure, the district court then concluded that the family’s 
claims against the school district and its employees were so frivolous that 
they should pay the defendants’ $38,903 in attorney fees and costs, an 
unusual award against a plaintiff in a civil-liberties case.139 A Fifth Circuit 
 
133.   Id. at *6. The family also brought due process claims against the district attorney whose 
office initially failed to secure an indictment against Bolton and the other accused student, which were 
dismissed as part of the same action. Id. at *3. 
134.   Id. at *5. 
135.   Id. at *4. 
136.   Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855–56 (5th Cir. 2010). 
137.   Id. at 855. 
138.   Id. 
139.   C. & C.S. v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:09-CV-374-TH, 2010 WL 11538532, at *1, 
*3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2010); Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 F. App’x 421, 424 (5th Cir. 2011). 
See also William H. ReMine, Civil Suits for Civil Rights: A Primer on § 1983, 26-NOV COLO. LAW. 5, 
11 (1997) (remarking that, in federal civil-rights cases, “[a]ttorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing 
party, but this usually applies only to prevailing plaintiffs.”); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 
U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (explaining that, while a prevailing plaintiff in an employment discrimination case 


















panel largely upheld the award but remanded  for downward adjustment on 
the grounds that the First Amendment portion of the case was not “so 
lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation.”140 
As Professor Norton has observed, the Silsbee case represents an 
aggressive application of Hazelwood where none of the Hazelwood Court’s 
concerns are implicated: There was no interference with learning, nothing 
was ungrammatical or poorly written, and the student’s unspoken message 
was not age-inappropriate for her audience.141 Indeed, the district court’s 
entire basis for deciding the case was the absence of any discernible 
message. Silsbee, then, represents Hazelwood stripped to its essential truth: 
It is about obedience for its own sake.142 
In Tinker, the Supreme Court regarded it as an unremarkable 
proposition that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over 
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under 
our Constitution.”143 The Silsbee case unsettles this settled principle: 
Students are not “persons” at all, it turns out, but insentient vehicles through 
which government authorities convey speech. 
  
 
his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or 
groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so”).  
140.   Doe, 440 F. App’x at 428. 
141.   Helen Norton, Imaginary Threats to Government's Expressive Interests, 61 CASE W. 
RSRV. L. REV. 1265, 1281–82 (2011). 
142.   See Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials 
and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 597 (2011) (observing that 
“inculcative” approach exemplified by Fraser and Hazelwood “asserts that restrictions on student speech 
can themselves serve an independent, valid educational function,” by teaching conformity to standards 
set by authority figures). 
143.   Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 

















III. THE CIVIC AND EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF STUDENT 
VOICE  
 
Hazelwood epitomizes the “inculcative” philosophy of education that 
views students as inert recipients of delivered knowledge, whose role is to 
accept and absorb it.144 But educational research, particularly in the field of 
civics, widely discredits this oversimplified model.145 As Professor Roe has 
written: “[S]tudents are not ‘empty vessels waiting passively to be filled by 
the school’s lessons . . . Knowledge is not simply inculcated or instilled 
directly by instruction but is assimilated or accommodated by the 
learner . . .”146 Students learn experientially—including by watching 
whether adult role models value, or devalue, civil liberties.  
In a survey of high school students in Kansas and Missouri, University 
of Kansas researcher Piotr Bobkowski identified a correlation between 
schools that students regard as respecting First Amendment values and 
students’ own sense of civic efficacy—that is, the sense that students could 
have a meaningful voice in shaping public policy.147 Teaching the 
Constitution in the abstract, but devaluing it in practice, breeds cynicism 
and creates a sense of civic futility, convincing students at a formative time 
in their development as citizens that the government gets to make its own 
rules and that “city hall” always wins.  
University of Kansas researchers have documented that the toll of 
censorship falls especially hard on female students, both because they are 
disproportionately likely to take part in journalism and because they are 
more prone to “self-censor” in anticipation of an adverse reaction from 
authority figures.148 A survey of 453 North Carolina high school journalists 
 
144.  See Waldman, supra note 141. 
145.   See Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual 
Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1292–93 (1991) (“The consensus of researchers and theorists . . . 
is that the learning process is properly characterized as developing thinking skills. This view of learning 
as ‘conceptual development’ is quite distinct from and contrary to an understanding of learning as the 
inculcation of values.”). 
146.   Id. at 1294. 
147.   Civic Engagement Among High School Journalists, CIVICS & JOURNALISTS (2015), 
http://civicsandjournalists.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Results-handout.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U6LA-RTB9].  
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found that 41% of female students and 28% of male students reported being 
told not to write about certain off-limits topics, with marijuana legalization 
and same-sex marriage as the top of the forbidden list.149 Of those directed 
to avoid taboo topics, 88% of female students reported that they complied, 
versus 64% of male students.150 
Notably, 52% of the students enrolled in public K-12 schools are 
nonwhite, while only 21% of teachers and 22% of principals are.151 This 
means that a policy of heavy institutional censorship puts largely white 
decision-makers in charge of deciding which perspectives of largely 
nonwhite speakers get to be heard. Student media is unlike other civic 
learning opportunities because of its counter-majoritarian ethic—exactly 
the ethic that Hazelwood censorship empowers schools to suppress. Student 
government and similar civic leadership programs reward people of high 
social status who conform to mainstream views.152 Student media provides 
an outlet for people with minority perspectives and contrarian views to feel 
heard.153  
The frustration and disempowerment of censorship discourages 
students from taking part in journalism education at a time when the skills 
and values that journalism education conveys are most desperately needed. 
Media futurist Dan Gillmor has identified five signature characteristics that 
distinguish good journalism: Thoroughness, Accuracy, Fairness, 
 
149.   Id. at 97. 
150.   Id. 
151.   NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACIAL/ETHNIC ENROLLMENT IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (May 2020), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cge.asp 
[https://perma.cc/TYB7-VBJ2]; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS (May 2020), 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_clr.asp#:~:text=In%202017%E2%80%9318%2C%20about
%2079,1%20percent%20of%20public%20school [https://perma.cc/9P7J-8V2Q]; NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPALS (May 2020),  
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cls.asp#:~:text=In%202017%E2%80%9318%2C%20about
%2078,and%209%20percent%20were%20Hispanic [https://perma.cc/KCH8-UQNW]. 
152.  See Meg Benner, Catherine Brown & Ashley Jeffrey, Elevating Student Voice in 
Education, CTR. FOR AMER. PROGRESS (Aug. 4, 2019) (citing student government participation as a 
vehicle for maximizing student voice in schools, but noting that student government “[g]enerally 
involves a small number of students who are elected by their peers and typically have higher social 
capital”). 
153.  See Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: Protecting the Student-Critic in Public 
Schools, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 253, 259 (2012) (arguing for stronger protection of student free-speech 
rights, because “[r]espect for social critics ensures that minorities participate in self-governance, 
incorporating potentially alienated outsiders into the body politic and diversifying the knowledge base 
for public decision-making”). 

















Independence, Transparency.154 These qualities, Gillmor writes, are the 
foundation of a 21st century education in navigating the realm of online 
information: “If we don’t teach our children the kind of critical thinking 
skills these principles imply, they will end up hopeless adrift amid an 
onslaught of media or so cynical that they will disbelieve trustworthy 
sources.”155 Essentially every American is involved in media whether as a 
consumer or as a creator (or, increasingly, as both). Gillmor’s principles of 
trustworthy journalism are values we should want every denizen of the 
online conversation to internalize and practice. 
The field of civic education is increasingly recognizing the importance 
of helping young people find on-ramps into the world of “participatory 
politics,” a peer-driven form of engagement that operates outside the 
confines of traditional power structures.156 Central to participatory politics 
is developing the skills to analyze and create digital media, as Professor 
Kahne and his colleagues have written: “[Y]outh will need an expanded set 
of skills if they are to effectively tap into the affordances of the digital age 
when engaging in investigation and research.”157 Preparing students to take 
on the work of policymaking and governance, civic educators widely agree, 
means giving students “voice” and “agency” that starts with the education 
they are receiving: “[P]olitical competency is best acquired by practicing 
the messy, often difficult, process of democracy. Students are less apt to 
gain political skills, values, and knowledge from sitting on the sidelines.”158 
And Hazelwood censorship has sidelined two generations of America’s 
best-informed, most engaged future leaders. 
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2009). 
155.   Id. at  9–11. 
156.   Joseph Kahne, Erica Hodgin & Elyse Eidman-Aadahl, Redesigning Civic Education for 
the Digital Age: Participatory Politics and the Pursuit of Democratic Engagement, 44 THEORY & RSCH. 
SOC. EDUC. 1, 4 (2016). 
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IV. VALUING NEW VOICES  
 
A. Uncensored Journalism Fulfills a Civically Valuable Function  
 
The Emmy-nominated HBO film, “Bad Education,” starring Hugh 
Jackman and Allison Janney, chronicles the downfall of a charismatic Long 
Island school superintendent, Frank Tassone, whose high-flying lifestyle 
was fueled by a massive embezzlement scheme that came crashing down 
with his 2004 arrest.159 The story is true. The catalyst for its disclosure was 
investigative reporting by a student reporter for the Hilltop Beacon, who 
was the first to publicly question Tassone’s spending.160 
Less cinematically, high school journalists in the southeast Kansas town 
of Pittsburg won nationwide acclaim when, in 2017, they broke news that 
the local professional media had overlooked: Their newly hired principal 
claimed to have earned two advanced degrees attending what turned out to 
be an online diploma mill.161 The story led the principal to resign, and the 
school to tighten its hiring standards.162 
In Pennsylvania, student reporter Grace Marion uncovered a scheme by 
school authorities to conceal the severity of sexual misconduct complaints 
against school employees—by maintaining the complaints in the files of the 
student complainants and not the employees, making sure that the 
documents could be kept confidential on student privacy grounds, and that 
the complaints would not follow the employees into future jobs.163 Marion’s 
reporting earned her the Hugh M. Hefner Foundation’s annual First 
 
159.  BAD EDUCATION (HBO Films 2019). 
160.   See EJ Dickson, What ‘Bad Education’ Got Right — and Wrong — About the Real-Life 
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The public is increasingly reliant on students to expose mismanagement 
or malfeasance in schools, because of the nationwide collapse of local news 
coverage, with thousands of newspapers closing or downsizing as 
advertising revenue evaporates.165 A Brookings Institution study, conducted 
even before recent cutbacks worsened the problem, found that only 1.4% of 
mainstream news stories were devoted to education.166 The Brookings 
authors identified censorship of student journalism as one of the 
impediments to the flow of information to the public: “Some school officials 
discourage student reporters from asking difficult questions or raising 
controversial issues. In fact, student journalism of this kind should be 
encouraged. Student newspapers often lead the media to important 
education stories.”167  
The Brookings research underscores the federal judiciary’s categorical 
failure to take into account the First Amendment interests of a critical 
forgotten constituency: The audience. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the First Amendment embodies not just a right to publish 
information but a right to receive it.168 When public schools use their 
governmental authority to get between journalists and their intended 
readers, both sides in the conversation lose something of value. Because 
students’ interests are more readily discounted, deferential judges invariably 
omit any discussion of the parents and policymakers who might benefit 
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from a candid insider perspective.169 
 
B. States and Increasingly Striking a More Sensible Balance  
 
While the Supreme Court sets the constitutional floor beneath which 
state and local governments may not venture, nothing prevents a state from 
extending its residents more than the constitutional minimum of civil 
liberties. Increasingly, states are awakening to the educational detriments of 
government-sanctioned censorship and granting students a state cause of 
action that restores the pre-Hazelwood level of press freedom.170 As of this 
writing, fourteen states have statutes that constrain school censorship 
authority, half of which have been enacted just since 2015.171 Most of these 
statutes explicitly limit the grounds for censorship to speech that would be 
legally actionable (such as libel) or substantially disruptive of school 
functions, restoring the Tinker balance.172 The reinvigorated reform 
movement takes its name, “New Voices,” from the 2015 New Voices of 
North Dakota Act that became a model for the country.173 A wide range of 
civic and educational organizations have endorsed the New Voices 
movement, including the American Bar Association, giving it newfound 
momentum.174 In an August 2017 resolution, the ABA House of Delegates 
unanimously called on states to fortify legal protections for student 
journalists and their faculty advisers, who frequently suffer the brunt of 
school retaliation.175 A report accompanying the ABA resolution drew a 
 
169.   See Norton, supra note 140, at 1267 (observing that Supreme Court’s aggressive use of 
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direct link between high-quality journalism education and civic and media 
literacy: “Meaningful civic education requires that students feel safe and 
empowered to discuss issues of social and political concern in the 
responsible, accountable forum of journalistic media.”176 
 
V. A WAY FORWARD RETHINKING DEFERENCE  
 
In its much-quoted Carolene Products footnote, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the normal presumption that regulations are to be reviewed 
deferentially may apply with less force when the regulations appear 
motivated by “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,” or affect 
the ability of underrepresented groups to invoke the protection of the 
political process.177 A Second Circuit judge vividly identified the perils of 
unchecked deference in the case of a New York English teacher unjustly 
fired for wearing an antiwar armband reminiscent of the Tinkers’: “The 
dangers of unrestrained discretion are readily apparent. Under the guise of 
beneficent concern for the welfare of school children, school authorities, 
albeit unwittingly, might permit prejudices of the community to prevail. It 
is in such a situation that the will of the transient majority can prove 
devastating to freedom of expression.”178 
Federal courts have justified giving a blank check of authority to school 
administrators on the grounds that judges lack expertise in managing 
educational institutions.179 But courts regularly decide cases involving 
unfamiliar industries and technologies on which they must educate 
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boards will make better decisions than a panel of judges with advanced 
college degrees when the decision requires knowledge of civil-rights law.181 
As the Court recognized in its most recent case involving freedom of speech 
and association in the setting of higher education: “This Court is the final 
arbiter of the question whether a public university has exceeded 
constitutional constraints, and we owe no deference to universities when we 
consider that question.”182 The level of hands-off deference afforded to 
educational institutions in Hazelwood is unprecedented in any other area of 
civil liberties other than in prisons and jails, and has, inevitably, invited 
abuse and overreaching.183  
In the Lawrence case that overturned Bowers, the Supreme Court 
recognized that adherence to precedent is no longer an imperative if 
subsequent legal and historical developments undermine the basis for the 
prior decision.184 Hazelwood is such a case, for many reasons. 
First, subsequent experience has now proven that the safety valve 
identified by the Hazelwood Court—that students could secure heightened 
First Amendment protection by obtaining “forum” designation for their 
publications185—in fact offers no relief at all. As demonstrated most vividly 
by the Second Circuit’s Ochshorn decision, even convincing a school to 
 
unusually resistant to outside analysis; courts regularly evaluate facts, set legal rules, and pass judgment 
in cases involving far more complex contexts”). 
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185.  See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 269–70 (1988) (describing the 
indicia that would signal an intent to operate a student newspaper as a public forum). 

















designate a student publication as a “forum” has become legally 
meaningless, because the school is free to “designate” the forum as suitable 
only for speech that school authorities deem appropriate, which is no more 
protection than Hazelwood.186 Moreover, post-Hazelwood decisions have 
found that the “designation” of a forum may be instantaneously revoked at 
the whim of the government for any reason, even a viewpoint-retaliatory 
reason, making the “designation” even more meaningless.187 Keeping in 
mind that the Hazelwood decision turned on a single vote, there is no telling 
how the case might have come out had the Court known that First 
Amendment law would evolve in such a way as to make a designated public 
forum largely a nullity. 
Second, Hazelwood is a product of a bygone time when it might have 
been conceivable to prevent a fourteen-year-old from being exposed to 
frank discussion of teenage pregnancy by removing pages from newspapers. 
Needless to say, we do not live in that world any longer. Nearly eighty-two 
percent of households have internet service, and more than eighty-nine 
percent of families can access the internet, either through a home 
subscription or through a smartphone.188 And the advance of online 
publishing, which dispenses with the need to distribute news publications 
on school property during the school day, has consequences for the 
“disassociation” interests of schools as well. Rather than exercise heavy-
handed censorship over student journalism, a school now has the ability to 
distance itself from the speech simply by enabling the students to publish 
on a third-party platform, such as WordPress, that bears no school web 
address or other outward indicia of school affiliation.189 
 
186.  See R.O. ex rel. Ochshorn v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 2011) 
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Third, the country is in the midst of an overdue rethinking of the lasting 
consequences of overzealous school discipline. Hazelwood is about 
disavowing sponsorship of speech, but its vagueness has invited sloppy 
misapplication by lower courts as a basis not just for refusing to distribute 
speech but also for punishing the speaker.190 It is no longer plausible to 
discount the mountain of evidence that removing a student from school, 
even once, can have life-altering consequences.191 A student suspended for 
writing an article or delivering a speech that is viewed as undermining the 
school’s curricular objectives may be set on a trajectory for becoming a 
dropout. The Obama administration prodded school authorities to revisit 
their zero-tolerance disciplinary codes to avoid hair-trigger expulsions that, 
disproportionately, fall on students of color and special-education 
students.192 Hazelwood represents a “zero tolerance” standard for 
controversy. The discrediting of zero tolerance discipline is occasion for 
rethinking whether adequate safeguards exist to meaningfully remedy 
unjust overreactions. 
Fourth, students at both the K-12 and college levels are engaging in 
political advocacy at levels not seen since the civil-rights movement of the 
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1960s and ‘70s.193 Students are assuming leadership in the movements to 
address climate change, gun violence, race-based policing practices, and 
any number of other causes.194 The great generational leveler of technology 
equips young people with unprecedented ability to be participants in 
policymaking and not just spectators.195 As America’s streets filled with 
“Black Lives Matter” demonstrators in 2020, students led the charge in 
calling for their schools to remove uniformed police officers,196 whose very 
presence creates an intimidating climate and heightens the danger that minor 
disciplinary scrapes will end with arrest.197 Student plaintiffs are leveraging 
the legal system to demand that the federal government act to secure their 
futures by addressing carbon emissions linked to global climate change.198 
But while students can litigate today’s weightiest political issues in court, 
they may be stopped from discussing them in the pages of a newspaper, if a 
school official regards the existence of climate change as a matter of 
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https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2020/06/26/more-school-districts-sever-ties-with-police.html 
[https://perma.cc/W2Y8-MT4X] (describing how student-led movements provoked districts in San 
Francisco, Seattle and elsewhere to limit or end ties with local police departments). 
197.   See Catherine J. Ross, “Bitch,” Go Directly to Jail: Student Speech and Entry Into the 
School-to-Prison Pipeline, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 717, 723 (2016) (“The proliferation of armed police 
officers at schools has only intensified the risks of entering the fast track from school to court.”). 
198.   In Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020), a split federal appeals court 
panel threw out the claims of young environmental activists on threshold redressability grounds without 
reaching the merits of their assertions. But they drew a supportive dissent from Judge Josephine L. 
Staton, who wrote: “There is no justiciability exception for cases of great complexity and magnitude.” 


















political controversy.  
Fifth, it is increasingly well-documented that the K-12 education system 
fails to provide young people with the knowledge and critical-thinking skills 
to be effective consumers of media and participants in civic life.199 
Readership of news among young people is in free-fall; the Pew Research 
Center reports that Americans under twenty-nine are the country’s least avid 
news consumers, with only two percent saying they “often” read print 
newspapers, sixteen percent saying they regularly watch television news, 
and thirteen percent regularly listening to radio news.200 We are confronting 
a moment in American history in which foundational legal norms that once 
underpinned our pluralistic society are being demolished.201 At this 
moment, it seems especially inadvisable for public schools to be inculcating 
students in authoritarianism, teaching them the lesson of Hazelwood that the 
government is always right and that the citizen-critic is always wrong. As 
the Second Circuit’s Judge Irving R. Kaufman presciently wrote in a case 
vindicating a teacher’s right to wear an antiwar armband in the classroom: 
“It would be foolhardy to shield our children from political debate and 
issues until the eve of their first venture into the voting booth. Schools must 
play a central role in preparing their students to think and analyze and to 
recognize the demagogue.”202  
Finally, other seemingly “settled” case law that demonizes the less-
powerful is being revisited in light of contemporary values. The Supreme 
Court used a 2018 case involving the Trump administration’s directive to 
impose “enhanced screening” on would-be visitors from countries with 
large Muslim populations,203 to disavow a case that was not even directly at 
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issue: Korematsu v. United States.204 In Korematsu, the Court turned aside 
a constitutional challenge brought by a California man imprisoned in an 
internment camp during World War II for violating a federal exclusion order 
targeting only people of Japanese ethnicity.205 The decision has been widely 
reviled and regarded as a dead letter, though never formally overruled.206 
But in Trump v. Hawaii,207 Chief Justice John Roberts took the opportunity 
to make explicit what legal scholars had long believed: “Korematsu was 
gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of 
history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’”208 
The repudiation of Korematsu followed fifteen years after the Court, in 
Lawrence, disavowed its anachronistic Bowers decision and declared that 
states could no longer criminalize consensual same-sex relations.209 As 
these rulings demonstrate, it is eminently defensible for the Court to revisit 
and correct shortsighted decisions when the societal norms and values 
underpinning those decisions evolve so that the decisions lack legitimacy. 
Indeed, the Court has done so in the realm of student speech, using its 1943 
Barnette ruling to set right an errant decision from just three years earlier 
that empowered schools to force students to pledge allegiance to the flag in 
derogation of their conflicting religious beliefs, which led to harassment of 
Jehovah’s Witness adherents.210  
Hazelwood, no less than Korematsu or Bowers, is a case birthed in 
bigotry that gives indulgence to bigotry.211 It demonizes young people, 
placing them in constitutional exile alongside convicted felons, for using 
their voices to question authority. It emboldened four federal judges to tell 
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his rationale for removing the student’s essay from a collection of her classmates’ work, the principal 
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home” and that “due to the type of school this is, the people that work here and the students and families 


















a teenage sexual assault victim that her wish to be free from school-
compelled praise for her accused rapist was a frivolous waste of judicial 
resources.212 As the Silsbee case amply demonstrates, no government 
official can be entrusted with limitless authority and boundless judicial 




Hazelwood is the Bowers v. Hardwick of our generation. The opinion 
reads like a curious relic of a benighted past, when adult authority figures 
believed that fourteen-year-olds did not know where babies come from and 
could be protected against teen pregnancy by remaining unaware of it. The 
decision exists for the sole purpose of worsening the power imbalance 
between students and the government institutions to which they are subject. 
To paraphrase Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, Hazelwood was not correct 
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. 
The foundational error around which Hazelwood is built is elevating the 
government’s reputation to a concern of constitutional value. Making the 
“imprimatur” of the school the triggering event for censorship authority was 
the Supreme Court’s tipoff that Hazelwood was not centrally concerned 
with miseducating students or exposing them to unsuitable material, but 
preserving the school’s image. The Court erased any ambiguity by 
recognizing the avoidance of political controversy as a wholly adequate 
justification for censoring even the highest quality and most educationally 
responsible journalism.213 In this way, Hazelwood is a bullet into the heart 
of the First Amendment, telling citizens that their grievances about the 
quality of government services they are receiving must be subordinated to 
the government’s concern for its reputation. 
In the landmark New York Times Company v. Sullivan case, the 
Supreme Court guaranteed news organizations the freedom to comment on 
the performance of government officials, because injury to the image of 
public officials is insignificant when weighed against the value of 
 
212.   See supra Section III.B. (discussing the district court and Fifth Circuit’s Silsbee decisions 
involving a disciplined Texas cheerleader whose First Amendment claim was held to be frivolous); see 
also Norton, supra note 141, at 1276 (calling the Silsbee case “an unusually powerful example of an 
action repugnant to individual autonomy”). 
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uninhibited dialogue about the issues of the day.214 There, the Court said: 
“Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech 
that would otherwise be free than does factual error . . . Criticism of 
[government officers’] official conduct does not lose its constitutional 
protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their 
official reputations.”215 For students, Sullivan exists as an aspirational 
abstraction on a page, its message dissonant from their lived experience.216 
Tellingly, in the censorship cases that have made their way into the 
public discourse through media coverage or litigation, school authorities 
rarely are motivated by any of the rationales cited by Principal Reynolds in 
censoring the Spectrum—that news stories invade privacy or expose young 
people to unsuitably mature subjects.217 Rather, the explanation is invariably 
some variation of “making the school look bad.” That the Hazelwood Court 
equipped schools with “image-maintenance” authority was, arguably, a 
piece of ill-considered dicta, since Principal Reynolds did not cite the 
school’s reputation or aversion to controversy as grounds for his censorship 
decision. So long as that dicta remains on the books, schools will regard 
their concern for unfavorable public reaction as a legitimate reason for 
censorship. 
As Professor Papandrea has pointed out, avoiding blame for citizens’ 
speech is a feeble justification for government censorship: “[T]he Court has 
recognized that it is not always reasonable to attribute speech to a property 
owner, at least when the property owner is legally compelled to permit the 
speech.”218 Papandrea identifies the destructive circularity of this reasoning: 
The more the government asserts control over the speech of its citizens, the 
more the public will blame the government for its content—justifying still 
greater control.219 
What Cathy Kuhlmeier and her classmates were doing is classic 
whistleblowing: Calling for adult authority figures to pay closer attention to 
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social problems already well-apparent to students.220 For the judiciary to 
give official sanction to the notion that students could be exposed to 
pregnant classmates without harm, but not to a news article discussing 
pregnancy, legitimizes denial and ignorance. Schools themselves benefit, 
whether they appreciate it or not, when students are able to illuminate 
problems to be addressed and corrected.221  
In a 2016 podcast interview, Kuhlmeier looked back with particular 
regret on the school’s removal of the Spectrum articles because of a story 
that was not even regarded as objectionable, exploring the teen runaway 
problem.222 The article offered advice and resources for students in troubled 
homes to keep them from turning to suicide.223 One Hazelwood East 
classmate, whom she referred to as “Reggie,” did run away from home and 
took his life in the restroom of a local department store.224 “I think that one 
for me is very hard to accept,” she said, “the fact that we weren’t able to 
publish those articles because of the slim chance that maybe Reggie read 
that article, maybe Reggie would still be here today, and I have a hard time 
accepting that. That we weren’t able to help out and reach someone.”225 
Enforced ignorance, too, has costs. Denying students access to accurate 
information about the problems in their lives, and a chance to air those 
problems and connect with others who share them, can result in life-altering 
harm. Hazelwood fails to value—or even acknowledge—those costs.226 It 
fails to weigh the lopsided consequences of a decision to censor too lightly 
(that a parent must have an uncomfortable conversation with her fourteen-
year-old about sex, or that the principal might receive irate telephone calls) 
against the consequences of a decision to censor too heavily (that students 
might be deprived of life-saving information, or that the public might be 
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kept uninformed of abusive school practices).227  
As Justice Brennan observed in his Hazelwood dissent, Tinker equips 
schools with all the authority they legitimately need: A student who 
interrupts math class by delivering a political speech can be punished for 
creating a substantial disruption, but a student who disagrees with the civics 
teacher’s views on capitalism cannot be.228 Perhaps the greatest irony of 
Hazelwood is that, while school administrators have spent thirty years 
convincing judges that everything that happens in the proximity of a school 
building is part of the instructional process, they have forgotten that their 
own behavior is included. As one prominent education journalist has 
written:  
In the midst of debates over what students should learn in 
civics and how to deliver those lessons, civics education 
advocates risk missing the larger context: Compulsory K-
12 schooling itself makes up the most intensive interaction 
the average American will have with a civic institution–far 
outpacing the time spent filling in a ballot, sitting in a jury 
box, or waiting in line at the DMV. . . . All but absent from 
the growing civics education conversation is the 
recognition that everyday interactions in schools also 
inform students’ civic development, and that often those 
interactions tell a totally different story about individuals’ 
rights from the government textbooks used in class.229 
Constitutional rights are our birthright as Americans. They are not 
rationed out by the government only to the “deserving.” But even if civil 
liberties were a prize to be earned, America’s teens have amply 
demonstrated their worthiness to join the exclusive “club” of humanity from 
which the judiciary has excluded them. The right was earned on the 
battlefield of Tallahassee, where amateur teen lobbyists harnessed their 
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outrage and grief to put school safety atop the 2018 Florida legislative 
agenda.230 The right is earned each day as teens use their expressive talents 
to organize reform movements,231 to save lives from suicide,232 and to help 
pass laws addressing social injustice.233 These young people are much more 
than government mouthpieces. It is past time for the judiciary to tell them 
so. 
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